We have all heard of Starlink. It is a megaconstellation of communication satellites in low Earth orbit, networked to provide internet connectivity to users on the surface. With little reliance on ground infrastructure, this technology shines where terrestrial broadband and terrestrial phone networks fail. And in a world that increasingly relies on constant, highly reliable connectivity for critical applications, Starlink offers solid redundancy from the sky that nothing on the ground can match. I have written about how this technology functions, if you want to gain detailed context:

Risks for India

Starlink is about to begin operations in India. With its large continental landmass and varied geography, India is an ideal candidate for benefiting from this technology. At this point, my colleagues and I felt that it was worthwhile highlighting the very real risks that India has to weigh alongside the benefits as it prepares to embrace Starlink.

I continue to be a believer in global markets and technology access. At the same time, I also feel that a country should be able to wield sufficient control over the flow of information in order to maintain a favourable balance of power. There are various aspects to this information control, but internet connectivity is a major pillar. I do not argue for this so as to enable a surveillance state. Political institutions should safeguard individual privacy, and that is a separate problem to solve. I argue for this from a strategic and tactical perspective.

Wholesale adoption of Starlink will allow SpaceX to leverage the dependence in ways that are contrary to the interests of Indians. The risks stem from the sheer scale of the moat that Starlink enjoys. As an individual exercising significant control in a private corporation, Elon Musk’s erratic personality and behaviour add a risky degree of unpredictability. He seems to wield influence over the US government, which also hints at the US government’s influence over him.

The existing mechanisms India has in place to safeguard against the data security risks from Starlink are woefully inadequate since they are difficult to enforce. The core risks persist.

Ultimately, India should continue to improve connectivity infrastructure and diversify satellite internet vendors to reduce overexposure.

Click here to read the full paper.

I co-wrote an opinion piece about this issue for India’s World.

Here is an excerpt:

… Despite its clock failures, Galileo maintained service because of its built-in redundancy with four clocks per satellite and over 24 satellites in orbit. GPS’s early clocks had very low lifespans, and yet the system survived because the US had over 30 satellites to absorb individual losses. This was underpinned by a domestic infrastructure that could buy, manufacture and launch satellites in larger numbers. The takeaway is that a navigation satellite system is a lot more than a cluster of satellites with atomic clocks that ISRO alone has to build and launch. Instead, it should be viewed as a national infrastructure that demands the same industrial depth, redundancy, and operational rigour as a power grid or a rail network…

… India built a strategically important system without building enough redundancy around it. NavIC uses high-altitude satellites. This design permits fewer satellites covering a smaller patch of sky than global-coverage lower-altitude positioning systems like the GPS. On the flip side, each NavIC satellite carries a disproportionate share of the coverage geometry… With its lean configuration, the loss of even a single healthy satellite can be debilitating. It can take the system from working reliably to barely working at all.

… The main challenge is uneven replenishment. Unsuccessful launches in 2017 and 2025 have disrupted the replenishment of the constellation with new satellites. Analysis of publicly available data suggests ISRO is rationing propellant on its remaining satellites to stretch their functioning lives before replacements arrive. Meanwhile, one of the last three functional satellites is past its ten-year design life… Building domestic launch capacity is not separate from fixing NavIC…

… Today, Indian systems can draw on GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, and BeiDou alongside NavIC. Each of those four foreign constellations is operated by a different geopolitical actor—the United States, Russia, the European Union, and China. Their interests diverge enough that in any plausible conflict scenario, if some of these systems are jammed, spoofed, or selectively denied, at least two are likely to remain available to India.

Click here to read the full article on India’s World.

My chapter was about the frugality of Indian space programme that we hear so much about. India launched Chandrayaan at a cost less than the budget of the movie Gravity. Indian mission to Mars was cheaper than the movie Interstellar.

This ability to achieve successful space missions with shoestring budgets started off as an effective political economy tool to the early Indian governments that had to justify spending crores on space missions instead of addressing health and hunger. Now, it has become bragging rights and often a brand identity for all of Indian endeavors in space.

The India that used this frugal strategy is different from the India we live in today. The country is now more prosperous, more ambitious and more capable. Then, the question that we should ask ourselves is: do we want to hold on to this identity in the present and for the future? Does it afford us the chance to be audacious that our ambitions demand?

These are the questions that I tried to answer in this book chapter. Here are glimpses of the arguments I make:

… ISRO’s frugality is not an inherent trait of the organisation, but a mathematical outcome as a result of a narrow objectives, simpler designs and testing through software simulations…

… This worked well for a world where ISRO only needed to launch a handful of rockets each year. Each launch was a national event. Each rocket was like a handmade product. That world is gone. Today, India needs to launch twenty or thirty times a year at the least. It is not there yet and is actively trying to close the gap. ISRO is changing to make this happen…

… The routine manufucturing and operational responsibilities will be transferred to the private sector. By harnessing the industrial scale of the private sector, the hope is that more of the commercial value of these technologies can be realised. Meanwhile, ISRO will only focus on the cutting edge, the projects that will push the boundaries of Indian technological capabilities in space like the new more powerful rocket or taking Indians to space…

… In other words, ISRO’s job now is to push into territory where failure is likely, timelines are uncertain, and the returns are measured in capability rather than cost-per-kilogram…

… For decades, ISRO’s identity, in the public imagination has been built around the word frugal. Frugal engineering. Frugal innovation. Missions cheaper than Hollywood films. But a research organisation that pushes frontiers cannot optimise for frugality. It must optimise for ambition. And after half a century of being rewarded for keeping costs down, it is not clear that ISRO has the institutional instinct or the sociopolitical permission to spend boldly, and when necessary, to fail expensively…

… None of this is to say the frugal era was a mistake. It was one of the great institutional achievements of post-independence India. A country that transported its first sounding rocket on a bicycle built a space programme that reached Mars on its maiden attempt, landed near the lunar south pole before anyone else, and launched satellites for thirty-six countries at prices no one could match. The engineers who did this deserve more than the word frugal. They deserve the word brilliant…

… Today, India is more prosperous, more ambitious and capable. The next decade asks something different. It asks ISRO to build a space station. To put Indians on the Moon. To develop rockets that land themselves and fly again. These are not tasks that reward the cheapest possible approach. They reward the fastest learning cycle, which means the willingness to build, break, rebuild, and break again, all in public, at great expense, with no guarantee of success…

… The word frugal will have to change its meaning if it is to remain useful. It cannot keep meaning cheap. It must come to mean disciplined—an institution that spends carefully not because it fears spending but because it respects what it is spending on. There is a difference between an organisation that avoids waste and an organisation that avoids risk. ISRO has always been the former. It must not become the latter.

You can buy the book on Amazon here.

If you cannot buy the book and wish to read the chapter, here is my draft of the chapter.

From the article:

It has been 53 years since humans went to the Moon under the Apollo programme. … the two are fundamentally different. The Apollo era was driven by Cold War politics and was a strictly American endeavour. Its goal was short-term missions for symbolic and scientific progress. In contrast, Artemis stands on a web of international collaborations and commercial partnerships. It aims to establish a long-term human presence on the Moon.

The Apollo programme was plagued by massive costs. Artemis is trying to overcome this issue by moving away from government-owned rockets in favour of commercially procured reusable rockets and hardware. This is built on the understanding that long-term lunar exploration can only succeed if it’s economically viable.

… The rush to the Moon mirrors the geopolitical competition on Earth between the United States and China. The Chinese Communist Party views space as a ‘critical domain in international strategic competition’. It aims to supplant the US as the world’s leading space power by 2049.

… By 2030, it has plans to land its astronauts, and by 2035, to construct a station on the Moon in partnership with Russia.

… If China establishes a dominant lunar presence first, there is a profound fear in the West that it could use ‘lawfare’ (legal warfare) to enforce “keep out” zones over the most valuable lunar territory. The Artemis programme is a vehicle to carry not just the US and its partners’ infrastructure but also the values and governing preferences outlined in the Artemis Accords, a set of voluntary guidelines for conduct on celestial bodies.

… The Moon is seen as a massive reservoir of untapped wealth. Some craters near its south pole are permanently shadowed from the Sun and contain water ice. This water is being positioned as the ‘oil’ of the lunar economy. Besides human sustenance, it can also be split into liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen to serve as rocket fuel. If mining this lunar water and turning it into fuel proves viable, the Moon can become a stepping stone to Mars and Deep Space. Besides water ice, the Moon also holds critical minerals indispensable for modern electronics. Also, the lunar soil has an abundance of Helium-3, a potential clean fuel source for future nuclear fusion reactors.

Many of these resources are geographically concentrated in small regions of the Moon... All of this creates a ‘gold rush’ dynamic to be the first to reach and control these strategic locations and orbits.

It is currently impossible to judge if mining lunar ice or critical minerals will ever be economically viable. There is also no clear or strategic military advantage to be gained from activities in cislunar space yet. However, in case the bets do pan out, the countries that manage it first will greatly increase their wealth and technological competitiveness.

Click here to read the full article.

But the story becomes more interesting when you include the budgetary revisions that happen a year after the allocation. The revised budgets are always lower than the allocations.

Adding the actual spending done by DoS/ISRO makes this even clearer. The department cannot seem to spend its budget fully.

In fact, it has failed to utilise even the revised budget every year in the last seven years. Only in 2019–20 did DoS actually spend all of its allocation, likely because of Chandrayaan–2 mission peak costs. Since 2020, the total unspent amount by DoS totals more than ₹12,000 crore—effectively equal to one full year’s expenditure.

Breaking down the budget

To try and understand these trends at a deeper level, we can look at the funding breakdown. Here is the breakdown for this year’s budget:

Let’s explore each segment one-by-one.

INSAT Systems segment

The INSAT Satellite Systems specifically funds communication satellites (like GSATs) that support TV broadcasting, telecommunications, and VSAT connectivity.

This year, with a mere ₹130 crore allocation, it makes for 0.9% of the total space budget. It is the least among the segments. A few years ago, this was not the case.

Even with absolute numbers, the INSAT budgets are falling.

This is an intended trend. The government has been reforming the space sector since 2019. One of the reforms is to unburden ISRO of its routine tasks. The INSAT satellite systems fall within this basket. They are being transferred to NewSpace India Limited (NSIL), which will take over these operations. NSIL functions on a commercial logic. It will continue to fund them through its own internal resources or loans, based on demand. So systems like the INSAT may even grow in time but it will do so without direct taxpayer money.

Space Applications segment

Space Applications consists of making use of the data we get from ISRO satellites already in orbit. It is the downstream space sector. It includes things like remote sensing, disaster management support, agriculture, and urban planning using satellite imagery.

This segment has seen a stable but flat funding of around 13% of the total budget. The services are continuing but there is no big government-led expansion in the application infrastructure.

This segment operates like a service provider. 79% of its spending is revenue expenditure. Revenue expenditures fund the day-to-day operations. We can think of it as the ‘maintenance’ budget. It does not create assets or reduce debt like the capital expenditure does, which is harder.

Most of the space applications budget is used for running the National Remote Sensing Centre (NRSC) and Space Applications Centre (SAC), paying scientists, and maintaining the Bhuvan and Bhoonidhi data portals. The small share of capital allocation is for upgrading data centres and purchasing high-resolution data processing units. As a result, you see fuller utilisation of the allocated budgets every year. The revisions stay nearly the same.

The lack of growth here indicates that the government wants to focus more on other infrastructure creation activities. Private players are expected to take over application development in due course.

Space Sciences segment

Space Sciences is the exploration arm. It funds planetary missions like the Chandrayaan series, Aditya-L1, Venus Orbiter and astronomy. This is a priority sector for ISRO, under the new space policy. ISRO is being unburdened of INSAT and application-related responsibilities so that it can focus on space sciences and other strategic missions.

The government’s intent shows. It is the fastest-growing vertical in the 2026–27 budget. It has seen a 4x increase and occupies around 4% of the total budget. But this is still too low considering this is now a core function of ISRO.

New project approvals for missions like Chandrayaan-4 and Shukrayaan are driving the increase in budget. Chandrayaan-4 aims to bring back moon rocks. Shukrayaan will be India’s first mission to orbit Venus. There are other projects on the horizon too like the Chandrayaan-5.

Space Sciences is a capital-heavy segment. 75% of the funds are for building hardware. Most of this year’s budget increase is for capital expenditure (from ₹98 crore revised budget in 2025–26 to ₹428 crore in allocated budget in 2026–27).

In 2025–26, the Department of Space projected a requirement of ₹876.14 crore for space sciences. However, the Government allocated only ₹371 crore. This year’s rebound to ₹569.76 crore could be because of last year’s cuts.

Despite the financial constraints, this segment has performed well. The successes of Chandrayaan-3, Aditya-L1, XPoSat and Astrosat highlight this. However, with actual spending consistently falling short of allocations, execution is lagging. Considering ISRO’s new mandate and the renewed global focus on lunar exploration, the spending here needs to increase.

Space Technology segment

The Space Technology segment is the largest and the most critical component of ISRO. It consumes over 76% of the budget. It covers the heavy engineering and much of the core research activities that form the bedrock of India’s ability to access and participate in outer space.

The technology budget includes:

• The development of launch vehicles. Launch vehicles are space rockets like LVM3, SSLV, PSLV and the upcoming NGLV.

• The human spaceflight programme like the Gaganyaan mission and precursors to the Bharatiya Antariksh Station, which will be India’s first Space Station.

• The development of Earth observation satellites like Oceansat and NISAR as well as navigational satellites for NavIC.

• The infrastructure maintenance of ISRO centres like VSSC, LPSC, and the spaceport at Sriharikota (SDSC-SHAR).

Evidently, developing rockets and human spaceflight infrastructure remains with the government. This is in line with the new space policy as well. This part of the space technology infrastructure is foundational. It supports all the other space sector activities in the country. 2026–27 budget has a higher capital outlay of around 46.5% compared to the previous years where it hovered around 40% or lower. The Space Technology segment is the main driver of the capital increase. It is being used to build the third launchpad at Sriharikota, the cryogenic engine testing centre, human-rating facilities for Gaganyaan and NGLV. The revenue expenditures cover the fuel and operations for the rocket launches planned for the year.

The Space Technology component sees the most ambitious allocations but also the steepest cuts. It suggests that big-ticket hardware development (rockets/human rating systems) faces significant delays, leading to surrendered funds. The actual spending (and revised budgets) are consistently a lot lower than the allocated budgets.

Slow pace of technology development has led the Finance Ministry to slash the budget at the revision stage for key projects. For instance, the Gaganyaan budget was cut from ₹1,200 crore (allocated) to ₹847 crore (revision) in 2024–25 due to delays in hardware realisation. The semi-cryogenic engine budget was cut from ₹190 crore to ₹115 crore. GSLV Phase-4 was cut by over ₹100 crore. So, this is a recurring pattern. Some of these delays are uncontrollable. There might be supply chain bottlenecks in international components. But the rest are controllable within ISRO and its vendors. The repeated mid-year cuts represent pauses in crucial R&D activities. It means a slowdown in indigenous innovation and delay in Indian space ambitions.

This is keeping in mind this segment’s successes that justify its high funding. The successful commercial deployment of 72 OneWeb satellites using LVM3; developing new capabilities like the SSLV to be transferred to the industry, the RLV (Re-usable Launch Vehicle) as a critical step towards reducing launch costs represent clear headway. There is the Gaganyaan progress also like the Test Vehicle (TV-D1) flight that demonstrated the Crew Escape System and the qualification of the LVM3 rocket for human rating.

India needs more government spending in Space

Drawing on Parliamentary Committee reports, I have added the ISRO projections below. The allocations are always lower than projections. This is not unique to space. There is always a gap between what the branches of the executive ask and what the Finance ministry can afford based on broader priorities and fiscal consolidation.

The most visible spike in projection was in 2020–21. ISRO projected ₹24,686 crore, probably because of Gaganyaan and Chandrayaan-3 development. The allocated budget was nearly half this amount. After all, it was the pandemic year. Since then, DoS seems to have rationalised its projections. The allocations are still lower but by much smaller margins. This indicates better alignment between ISRO’s planning and the Finance Ministry. But this does not mean the space programme is getting all the money it needs.

Indian space budget is ~0.05% of GDP. Other dominant space powers spend orders of magnitude higher than what India spends and this is not counting the commercial funding.

The previous ISRO chairman has said that the Indian space sector’s budget needs to be a lot higher. This is true. The private sector cannot do the things ISRO is tasked to perform. Planetary exploration, lunar missions, and human spaceflight aren’t just for scientific prestige. They come with geopolitical logic and are hard necessities for a space power today. Nations around the world have renewed focus and accelerated spending on their national space programmes in pursuit of these goals. If India fails to keep up in these technological races, it will have to bear political costs. It will lose its seat at the table that will decide the norms, rules, and benefit-sharing of humanity’s endeavours in space.

Bridging the gap between intent and outcomes

Another consistent trend we notice across all the segments and have already discussed is that the actual spending is significantly lower than allocations. Project delays are leading to unspent funds being returned. This high surrender ratio is pervasive within the broader category of scientific departments that includes space, biotechnology as well as science and technology.

This is a state capacity problem and not one of political will. The government has been consistent in allocating over ₹13,000 crore over the last few years. The political intent and support show. The leadership wishes and expects ISRO to achieve its objectives. The bottleneck is ISRO’s absorption capacity. This is particularly evident in ISRO’s capital expenditure. A large portion of the unused budgets often comes from the capital side which includes infrastructure, equipment and facilities—all critical for long-term growth. In fact, DoS’ surrender ratio is higher compared to sectors like Defence or Road Transport which also have capital-intensive activities. Those ministries have used their capital budgets more aggressively in recent years.

This issue can be addressed by positioning the government as an anchor customer for space technology. Not as an investor, not as a subsidiser, but as a customer. Since the new space policy has liberalised the sector, it is no longer a government monopoly. There are over 300 startups and traditional companies in the country alongside ISRO. Most are nascent with few avenues for funding and fewer avenues for early commercialisation. There is enormous scope for the government to act as a customer through service contracts with these companies.

The anchor customer model

An anchor customer relationship is where the government commits to buying services (launch, imagery, analytics) from a private firm at meaningful scale and over multiple years. This allows the firm to justify upfront capital expenditure and attract private capital. The secret ingredient that unlocks these things is the credible demand.

This is not entirely new to the Indian experience. The first instances of government acting as a customer in the space sector began with component contracts between ISRO and industry. Vendors supplied components and subsystems to ISRO’s missions. They were build-to-print contracts. ISRO designed everything. The private sector built it according to these specifications. ISRO absorbed all the risk as well as all the credit or blame. The vendor was rewarded for delivery and not for market success. They had no incentive to innovate on architecture, business model or other downstream services.

The more recent instance of the sector moving closer to anchor customer model comes from NSIL. The space reforms have positioned NSIL as ISRO’s commercial arm. ISRO has transferred the ownership of its Earth observation and communication satellites to NSIL. Other government ministries, foreign, and domestic customers approach NSIL for space technology services. NSIL provides these services by leveraging ISRO assets and by outsourcing the work to Indian industry whenever it can. For example, the Ministry of Defence is paying ₹3,000 crore to NSIL for the GSAT-7B communication satellite to fulfil the army’s needs. NSIL will pull in the industry to build and operate the asset. Another instance is NSIL using the HAL-L&T consortium to build PSLVs. This PPP model is structurally very close to an anchor-customer model, but not quite there yet. Because the demand is still not credible enough. It is coming from outside and can be inconsistent. For instance, foreign customers may prefer to launch via SpaceX over NSIL since SpaceX offers more reliable launch schedules or cheaper costs.

In a true anchor customer model, private firms design and own the satellites, launchers, analytics platforms and offer them as services to the government. Government buys outcomes, not ownership of hardware. If the government commits to a multi-year off-take, it will have de-risked capital expenditure, and the private firm will attract private equity or debt that it otherwise would not be able to. At the end of it, the firms will own their IP and can go on to export the same service globally. Many globally successful space companies like SpaceX, AWS, and Northrop Grumman emerged from this model.

India is already in the early stages of doing this systematically. There is currently an Earth observation-PPP project where a consortium of companies are investing over ₹1,200 crore to design, build, own and operate a constellation of satellites (government as an anchor customer de-risking capital expenditure). They will use this asset to sell imagery and analytics to government and armed forces in India. Though they call it a PPP, this is functionally the government acting as an anchor customer for EO services. In another instance, the Telangana government has signed a contract with a private company to digitise farmlands to replace manual crop surveys. As a result, these companies have attracted new private investment (government as an anchor customer unlocking private investment).

Clearly, the anchor customer model is taking shape in the country. But the instances are few and far between. Government should fund more contracted service payments to Indian firms that can grow and add to India’s space prowess.

A lot of that has changed in recent times. The bipartisan consensus in Washington that favoured India is now less predictable and more contested under Trump. We’re facing US economic pressure that, in some sectors, is as consequential as anything China throws at us. Right now, India faces among the steepest US tariffs, steeper than China’s.

Meanwhile, the Indo-Pacific remains as fragile and volatile as ever. Several neighbours face acute instability. Political crises, conflict, or debt stress often afflict them simultaneously. These circumstances limit opportunities for long-term economic engagement. Meanwhile, the war and sanctions have severely constrained Russia, inflicting long-term damage to investment and access to technology. Sanctions have forced Russia to redirect trade and procurement toward a smaller set of partners, especially China.

Amidst all this, the Free Trade Agreement with the EU is announced—at a crucial time when India seeks new economic and technological options. To assess its value amid geopolitical volatility, we must determine whether the FTA’s foundation supports a strategic superstructure that secures India’s interests.

The FTA sets a framework for predictable regulatory cooperation. This groundwork enables credible partnerships in critical sectors without duplicating efforts. Here are some examples.

Many countries want to accelerate their space programs to match the launch cadence of the US and China. India and France could anchor a consortium with Brazil and Indonesia. India provides low-cost launches. Brazil offers equatorial launch sites that can reduce costs. France supplies advanced satellite payloads. Indonesia has an acute communication and maritime surveillance requirement across 17,000 islands. The EU deal matters here because it pushes India and France toward clearer, more predictable rules around trade and IP—reducing friction for joint projects. In an aggressive but realistic timeline, this group could launch a jointly owned earth-observation constellation within three years and a communication megaconstellation in five. Operational capability, shared sovereignty, strategic independence.

When it comes to AI and compute, India and several European countries share the same strategic vulnerability in terms of access, along with the UAE and Japan. France brings open-weight AI models, the UAE offers deployment capital, Japan provides semiconductor packaging expertise, and India contributes engineering depth and market demand. The FTA aims to de-risk collaboration by clarifying IP, services, and digital-trade disciplines over time, enabling capability-building now as the broader agreement phases in. These four nations could establish shared compute infrastructure within 18 months and jointly develop open alternatives to Compute Unified Device Architecture and Electronic Design Automation tools.

Gathering ideas from a collective brainstorming exercise at the Takshashila Institution, I’ve written a paper about this with my co-authors. We have argued that sectoral plurilateral blocs, like the examples above, provide shared resources, collaboration, and resilience, making them our best bet for overcoming geopolitical coercion.

Our paper outlines 12 such sectoral blocs spanning semiconductors, fintech, counterterrorism, cyber-fraud, disaster relief, migration, pharma and more. By participating in these blocs, India reduces single-point dependencies, creates alternatives, and gains more flexibility to navigate a world where old certainties have weakened. Each bloc delivers specific benefits, such as secure access to technology, improved crisis response, or greater economic autonomy.

Link to the paper: https://takshashila.org.in/content/publications/20260125-Sectoral-Plurilateral-Blocs.html

In my latest Op-Ed for The Print, I argue that while these setbacks are serious, they are statistical anomalies for a workhorse with a 95% rate of success over three decades. The real challenge is not a 𝘣𝘳𝘰𝘬𝘦𝘯 rocket. It is the managing of a mature technology system during a critical transition in India’s space policy.

I explore why this moment feels heavier than past failures and outline a constructive path forward: transparency, a clear return-to-flight plan, and keeping the long game in sight.

From the article:

… For decades, it maintained an unbroken streak of successes. It earned a global reputation as one of the most reliable launch vehicles. It carried the weight of India’s most visible scientific missions like the first lunar probe (Chandrayaan-1), the first Mars orbiter (Mangalyaan), and the first solar observatory (Aditya-L1). Few rockets have demonstrated this level of mission flexibility.

The point here is this: The PSLV is a mature piece of technology. It is a platform designed, optimised, and perfected over three decades. But even mature technology is not immune to entropy. Systems can drift when suppliers change, components age, and processes evolve. However, ISRO has proven it knows how to build a reliable launch system, how to run missions repeatedly, and how to recover from setbacks. It is reasonable to believe ISRO can fix PSLV again…

… it must prioritise three decisive actions.

… it should commit to a clear cadence of communication: What is known, what is still being tested, what hypotheses have been ruled out, and when the next update will come. Silence creates a vacuum that gets filled with speculation. It is bad for commercial confidence.

… The industry needs to see a checklist. By when will the failure investigation be closed? By when will corrective actions be completed? What additional verification tests will be done on the ground before flight? What are the “go/no-go” criteria for declaring PSLV ready again? This restarts the rest of the ecosystem and commercial plannin

… keep the long game in sight. As ISRO moves toward higher-risk missions, failures become more likely because the frontier is harder. That is exactly why a culture of openness and process discipline must begin now.

Click here to read the full analysis here: theprint.in/opinion/isro-was-set-to-move-on-to-a-new-era-pslv-failure-has-stalled-indias-space-policy/2830706/

(𝘕𝘰𝘵𝘦: T𝘩𝘦 𝘩𝘦𝘢𝘥𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘱 𝘸𝘦𝘳𝘦 𝘤𝘩𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘯 𝘣𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯.)

I wrote about it for the Hindu’s Text and Context today:

Link to the website version: https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/how-does-satellite-internet-work-explained/article69924030.ece.

I write for the Indian Express in this opinion piece:

… we must first stop thinking of “space” as a single destination. A more useful framework is to think of Earth as our home, the immediate space around us as the farm that sustains it, and deep space as the great, unexplored wilderness.

The farm (Earth-Space)

The farm is the region around Earth, known as the Earth-Space, where our satellites operate. This farm sustains life in our home. It is not food which is grown here, but data. Modern life depends on this data for everything — GPS for navigation and financial transactions, satellites for weather forecasting and broadcasting, and constellations for the global internet.

The farm is not tended to by humans. Uncrewed technology like satellites and probes are able to do this job far more cheaply and safely. The potential for the data they generate is endless and priceless.

The astronauts we send to this farm through missions like the Axiom-4 and Gaganyaan are not mere passengers. They are pioneering specialists trained to survive beyond the safety of our home and skilled in performing complex tasks and experiments that require human ingenuity and dexterity. Their experience and learning inform their successors who will dare to venture out even further into the wilderness.

The wilderness (outer space)

The Moon, Mars and beyond are fundamentally different from our home and even the farm. They are full of risks and opportunities. Today’s technology cannot use this region for sustenance at home. The costs of accessing the resources here are either too high, take too much time or both. With scientific advancement and technological progress, perhaps our farms can expand to these regions. Or even form a new settlement in the wilderness and go on to build another home and another farm around it. Therefore, the exploration and discovery of the wilderness is necessary to realise the long-term opportunities.

As a part of exploring this wilderness, uncrewed missions like Chandrayaan and the Mars rovers are sent first. They are the “drones” that scout out the region. They map the terrain, identify risks, and locate resources. They go first because it is dangerous and unknown.

However, you don’t build a settlement in a wilderness with scouts alone. You need pioneers. Humans are adaptable, can problem-solve in real-time (the “Apollo 13 moment”), and make intuitive leaps that a pre-programmed rover cannot…

Winning hearts and minds

The human element extends beyond the practical reasons. Great endeavours are powered by human emotion. The story of Shubhanshu Shukla venturing into the cosmos on behalf of his nation captures the imagination of millions. The stories provide a human face to a highly technical and challenging endeavour. They become focal points for national pride and aspiration.

This public imagination is not just a feel-good emotion. It is a strategic asset. Like India-Pakistan cricket matches, it helps societies surpass domestic squabbles. It creates a groundswell of popular support that translates into political will…

The long game

As technological progress accelerates, the question will shift from whether humanity will travel to other planets, to who will travel and write the rules. In this future, human spacefaring capability is no longer just symbolic; it is central to Indian national power and international standing.

The nations that are physically present in the “wilderness” will be the ones who shape the future of humanity in space. They will set the precedents for law, commerce, and ethics beyond Earth. Gaganyaan is India’s entry ticket to having a seat at that table. It is a declaration that India intends to be a rule-maker, not a rule-taker.

Read the full article here: https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/as-axiom-4-and-shubhanshu-shukla-lift-off-so-does-india-10088066/

While we often think of space as a vast, infinite frontier, the area that is of most consequence and increasingly contested is Earth-space—the part that envelops our planet.

I discuss these ideas and more in my journal article in 𝘿𝙚𝙘𝙮𝙥𝙝𝙚𝙧.

Thrilled to be in incredible company in this latest issue, which features contributions from Paul Krugman and Najeeb Jung.

Download the full PDF here: https://asiaresearch.co/decypher-journal-em-powered-authority-in-a-fragmented-world/

A few months later, the Trump administration has repealed the framework. Unsurprisingly, the reasons stated are about innovation and diplomatic relations. Yet, the same thinking remains, in other forms. I suspect that we haven’t seen the last of such framework for AI control by the US.

My colleagues and I have written a short issue brief about the implications of this move.

From the brief:

India was unfavourably placed in tier 2 of the AI Diffusion Framework. This placement meant that there were some thresholds on the number of AI chips that India could procure. However, the hard caps on the number of chips were far higher than the current demand in the Indian compute ecosystem. In other words, India could have gotten all the chips it wanted in the next few years under the framework.

Additionally, the framework had many second-order effects against Indian prerogatives. The framework would have undermined India’s goal of maintaining a level of strategic autonomy in its technology ecosystem. The possibility of Indian Global Capability Centres (GCCs) being denied access to advanced AI chips as country thresholds were reached or having to seek authorisations for purchasing chips is not an ideal situation. This could have led to tier 1 countries becoming the favoured destination for building cutting-edge technologies over tier 2 countries. These constraints would have led to a loss of talent and investment from India to tier 1 countries.

Given these realities, the government’s emphasis on building sovereign compute via GPU procurement warrants reconsideration. Indian companies are now free to procure all the chips they need, and the government could focus on other priorities. Union Minister of Electronics and IT, Ashwani Vaishnaw’s, recent comments about Indian efforts towards developing indigenous GPUs by 2029 could be seen as a response to US attempts at maximising control of the technology.

Despite the repeal of the framework, it is clear that this is an era of export controls for AI chips. The geopolitical climate will undoubtedly continue to dictate the ebb and flow of AI chip access. In its aspirations for strategic autonomy, India has a reason to develop a baseline capability in making its own advanced AI chip ecosystem. However, India is heavily reliant on foreign-made software and machinery. This makes the prospect of India rapidly developing these capabilities on its own highly unlikely. The extent to which the US and its allies will help India in this regard will not only depend on India-US relations but also India’s own position in the AI value chain.

Read more at: takshashila.org.in/blogs/us-ai-diffusion-framework-repealed

Satellite internet is not a new invention. We have operationalised it decades ago. However, the satellite internet megaconstellations of today mark a new age of space-based internet. They consist of hundreds and thousands of satellites in the Lower Earth Orbit, working together to beam a global internet.

Given the penetrative, foundational and integrative ability of the internet, satellite internet technology holds immense potential for military strategy and economic productivity. Its inherent dual-use nature also creates security and regulatory challenges. It is imperative that we understand this technology before we go about using, investing or governing it.

I have written a paper, a first in a series planned around satellite internet megaconstellations, where I explain how it all works and what it is being used for. Give it a read: takshashila.org.in/research/satellite-internet-explained

From the article:

…Even among key allies exempt from export controls, this policy sets a concerning precedent of unilateral American executive action that could potentially deny them their strategic priorities in the future… Countries, including U.S. allies, will become more motivated to develop independent supply chains and sovereign AI innovation to circumvent U.S. technological constraints. This could fragment the global AI ecosystem that the U.S. currently dominates…

The policy framework disadvantages India, positioning it less favourably than anticipated…The framework evaluates India solely by its technological capabilities in AI, while ignoring the strategic value of the India-U.S. partnership. It also disregards the substantial social capital built between the two countries... Instead, it serves as a stark reminder of the U.S.-led technology denial regimes that restricted India’s access to nuclear technologies for three decades following its nuclear tests.

There is a disconnect between America’s export control policies and its strategic partnership with India regarding Indo-Pacific cooperation… It could compel India to hedge against its technological and economic dependence on the U.S.

Read more at: https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/implications-of-the-ai-diffusion-framework/article69210897.ece

… The space sector is highly capital-intensive, and the Rs 1,000 crore proposed by the government is insufficient to satisfy the funding needs of space startups.

… The government would be better served by using the Rs 1,000 crore fund to enable the purchase of more such services from the private space sector in India.

Having the government as an anchor customer provides a stable source of demand for space-based services, reducing uncertainties in the market. It will boost the industry and increase investor confidence in the Indian space sector, which can draw in more investments from home and abroad. It will also induce healthy competition among companies, enabling only the best to win government contracts. Finally, such an approach incentivises innovation, efficiency, and overall success among Indian space startups.

… NASA’s Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) programme is an excellent example of how this government procurement model yields favourable outcomes for all stakeholders. In 2004, the US government announced that its space shuttles would be retired due to high costs and safety concerns. The COTS programme was started in 2006 to replace the space shuttles.

Under the COTS programme, companies had to achieve certain milestones to avail payments, ensuring the funds were linked to performance and progress. The risk was shared between the companies and the government, rather than the government bearing all the risk with upfront investments.

The programme was a success. SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket and Orbital Sciences Corporation’s Cygnus spacecraft were developed under COTS. SpaceX completed a cargo delivery demonstration in 2012, restoring the American ability to resupply the International Space Station (ISS).

Read the full article here: https://theprint.in/opinion/govts-rs-1000-cr-fund-for-space-sector-has-drawbacks-it-should-bet-on-outcomes-not-ideas/2222314/

… The government established NewSpace India Limited (NSIL), a central public sector enterprise, as ISRO's commercial arm. One of NSIL's main functions was to build and launch satellites based on market demand. This approach has led to a decrease in the launch of ISRO-built satellites, as NSIL now seeks end customers prior to actual launch.

… The deployment of these satellite constellations is driving demand for launch services globally. Even ISRO's LVM3 rocket carried 72 OneWeb satellites across two launches in 2022 and 2023, which marks the first instance of Indian rockets launching satellites for space-based internet…

… ISRO’s priority must be to drive costs down. Despite being praised for their low-cost launches, ISRO faces stiff global competition from companies like SpaceX, which have already implemented and tested reusable launch technology. This technology enables SpaceX to offer more competitive prices per kilogram of payload…

… For the foreseeable future, it is crucial for the government to assume the role of the anchor customer, providing stability and certainty to the burgeoning space ecosystem. This support will not only catalyse the expansion of space launch industries but also foster local development and spur innovation within the sector.

Read the full issue brief here: https://takshashila.org.in/blogs/demand-for-space-launch-services-in-india

From the article:

Space Shuttle’s retirement created an opportunity: When the US retired the Space Shuttle, Nasa had no ready substitute spacecraft…

A burgeoning American space industry cultivated robust capacities in LEO that has led to a flurry of private spacecraft capable of taking crew and cargo to orbit. Their pursuit of a competitive advantage spurred the development of reusable spacecraft, slashing launch costs by a staggering 95% compared to the Space Shuttle era. These advancements have done wonders for space accessibility, opening wider doors to Nasa and many space and satellite companies globally. We can create similar opportunities in India…

…The transfer of technical knowledge from Isro to the private sector for LVM3 production will spread crucial space expertise. These capabilities could then strengthen India’s supply of launch vehicles to meet growing global demand for launch services.

Read more at: www.livemint.com/opinion/online-views/private-sector-participation-in-lvm3-production-could-mean-a-space-sector-boom-11718129556130.html

From the article:

…Cryogenic and semi-cryogenic rocket engines offer much higher energy density and specific impulse than traditional solid- and liquid-fueled engines. Specific impulse measures the engine’s efficiency in converting propellant to thrust. It is essentially the rocket’s ‘mileage’. Semi-cryogenic engines are the most popular rocket engines used today. Compared to solid-fuelled variants, semi-cryogenic engines allow for higher variability of thrust—the ability to throttle.

They also offer a higher thrust-to-weight ratio than liquid-fueled engines. Additionally, propellant storage and handling are simpler in semi-cryogenic rockets than in liquid-fueled ones. This is also true for cryogenic rockets that use liquid hydrogen, which needs to be stored in heavy insulation tanks. Semi-cryogenic engines use denser liquid kerosene, which can be stored in a smaller volume, reducing the overall weight of the engine and the launch vehicle…

There are key strategic advantages, too. All spacecraft, after being launched, must pass through a precise point on the opposite side of the globe, called an antipodal point, before completing their first orbit. Potential adversaries could blockade this antipodal point of well-known spaceports such as Sriharikota or the upcoming Kulasekarapattinam, thereby cutting off India’s access to orbit. However, the capability to launch from any location enables India to overcome this vulnerability…

…Heavy launch missions have significant advantages over dedicated ones. For instance, multiple smaller payloads can be launched together on heavy launch vehicles, which makes these missions significantly cheaper…

…Heavy launch vehicles can reduce the need for expensive efforts to reduce the size and weight of satellites. This lowers barriers and opens access to space to more players, empowering the entire space economy.

Read the full article: www.firstpost.com/opinion/agnikuls-first-test-flight-time-for-private-sector-to-be-wings-of-indian-space-industry-13779865.html

From the article:

The guidelines describe the process of this authorisation for the different areas of space-based technologies such as satellite communication, rocket launch services, and earth observation. Yet key areas such as scientific missions, and positioning, navigation, and timing services, which enable GPS and air traffic control, are missing from the guidelines…

Space-based services range from telecommunication services to military applications to cybersecurity, and fall under different ministries and departments under the Government of India. Though IN-SPACe is a ‘single window agency’ for authorising space activities, private players must seek separate clearances from relevant ministries even after getting a provisional authorisation from IN-SPACe.

…Ultimately, India needs a space regulation Act that addresses the gaps in the guidelines. Its formulation should be a consultative process with inputs from all stakeholders. Together, these legislation can democratise the space governance ecosystem, and provide the necessary legal clarity that the private sector expects before undertaking risky ventures. The path to a burgeoning private space sector in India starts with the right regulatory environment.

Read the full article: https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/new-guidelines-could-hamper-indias-promising-space-industry-3035235

Each of these components plays a vital role in making AI tick. The variety within each component type offers trade-offs between performance and efficiency. As a General Purpose Technology, AI will shape techno-national strategies worldwide. All stakeholders need to understand these specialised chips and support the development of alternatives to ensure a more diverse and resilient AI chip ecosystem.

Toward this end, I have co-authored a paper that provides an understanding of these various AI chips, their characteristics, limitations, and what makes them suitable for certain AI applications and not others. It also provides an overview of the global market landscape and identifies some single-vendor dependencies and monopolies. Ultimately, it emphasises fostering open-source technologies and ecosystem diversity.

Click to read the full paper here.

When I started thinking about space strategy, I wanted to understand why the reforms were necessary, what they hoped to achieve, and where they fall short—as much for myself as for others in the business of space. Here is what stood out:

• The Indian space program had a peculiar problem of very high capability and very little scale because of a legacy state monopoly.

• The grander ambitions India has set for itself in recent years are greater in scope and scale. They necessitate a transformation.

• The government has set up agencies to promote, commercialise and regulate the non-governmental entities undertaking activities in space.

• These responsibilities are often contradictory, and that contradiction helps a nascent space industry in the short term but may work against a more mature ecosystem in the long term.

• In the process, ISRO will have to cede some of its presence in operational space missions and shift focus to the cutting edge.

• India needs to legitimise the reforms with space legislation.

• The only way to foster a self-sustaining space industry now is through government as an anchor customer.

Click here to read the full paper.